Friday, February 14, 2014

Heidegger's ghost continues to haunt the Zionists

Contents

1. 69th Anniversary of the Allied holocaust in Dresden

2. Martin Heidegger's Ghost Continues to Haunt the Zionists

THIS DAY IN HISTORY: Today, Feb. 14, is the 69th anniversary of the Allied fire bombing holocaust against the art city of Dresden, Germany, where upwards of 100,000 civilians were incinerated, and the priceless art treasures of the historic city were forever obliterated. The Hollywood movie “Monuments Men” is brimming with self-righteous portrayals of American soldiers as the saviors of art works stolen by the “evil Germans.” Hollywood puts a higher price on aesthetic artifacts than on human life, in that the incinerated civilians of all the major cities of Germany do not register on the conscience of the producers of this pompous “Monuments Men.” Even if we limit concern to aesthetics alone, the savage carpet-bombing of these mostly medieval German cities wiped out a fairy tale architecture of awesome beauty. The saturation incendiary bombing by the RAF and the US Army Air Force was one of the most barbarian assaults in the history of the West. Because the victims were the “wicked” German people however, this holocaust is barely a blip on the moral outrage screen of our patrician “Good War” enthusiasts. In terms of art, what the Allies destroyed in Dresden alone, surpasses by a factor of a thousand what the Nazis appropriated. —Michael Hoffman

Martin Heidegger’s Ghost Continues to Haunt the Zionists

By Michael Hoffman
Copyright©2014 www.revisionisthistory.org

Martin Heidegger is a far more complex philosopher than the following hysterical screed from the Jewish Daily Forward (see below) lets on. Most subversive of the profile in the Judaic publication is the fact that Heidegger was the disciple of the pro-Christian Judaic thinker Edmund Husserl; and Heidegger’s long-time lover was the Judaic author Hannah Arendt, whose book on Adolf Eichmann created a bitter controversy when she argued that the Nazi officer did not represent any special category of evil, a point that would be impossible for any major intellectual to make today, assuming they cared about their career and reputation.

We disagree with Heidegger on certain points, including his derogatory attitude toward the Old Testament and his mistaken notion that the Ashkenazi and Sephardic peoples were of Semitic ethnicity, a staple fiction of the Nazi weltanschaung (it is more likely that it was the ten tribes of Israel that went north to found Europe itself: — cf. Steven M. Collins, Israel’s Tribes Today). 

Heidegger’s appeal to an irrational typology as an antidote to the sordid materialism of the modern world, is born of völkisch ethics divorced from the laws of the Bible, which Howard B. Rand, in his indispensable Digest of Divine Law, enumerates; and which formed the very root of the early American Republic and the enormously attractive freedom and order it engendered. Völkisch values can indeed be an asset, when they comprise a natural law adjunct of the revealed Christian religion. The novels of Fyodor Dostoyevsky are a prime example of the proper application of the volkstum spirit (in the Anglo-Saxon sphere this translates as the spirit and values of the yeomanry. Absent Martin Luther’s antinomianism, the Anglo-Saxon yeomanry more often than not were steeped in a Biblical ethic, as evidenced by the people of the thirteen colonies of British America).

German antinomianism of the type promoted in Germany by the NSDAP is a legacy of Luther’s over-reaction against the attempt on the part of anti-usury crusaders (who were initially inspired by Luther’s own polemic against usury!), to reinvigorate Mosaic proscriptions against the Money Power (cf. this writer’s “Martin Luther and Zinskauf: The German Reformation in the Context of the Struggle Over Usury,” Revisionist History no. 65).

For all that, we cannot help but admire the fact that Heidegger, who was the most eminent existential philosopher of the 20th century, never completely repented or recanted his advocacy of German independence from the degenerate modern zeitgeist. His defiance continues to bug the traditional enemies of Truth to no end. They ceaselessly argue that all who dissent from the tenets of Holocaustianity and Israeli claims to an exclusive right to racial-nationalist chauvinism in the wake of Auschwitz, are “crackpot pseudo-intellectuals.” Yet even the most rabid detractor of Martin Heidegger could not credibly stake a claim to such a charge concerning the author of the magisterial Being and Time (1927); ergo, they must batter his prestige and blacken his name in other, underhanded ways, as they have attempted to do with Chaucer, Aquinas, Shakespeare, Dickens, Ezra Pound, Paul de Man, and all luminaries of our civilization who are denounced as “antisemitic” moral lepers by the self-appointed superiors not only of mankind, but above God himself (cf. BT Bava Metzia 59B).

We also note that in the midst of the latest howls against Heidegger, up pops the pioneering homicidal gas chamber skeptic Robert Faurisson, long consigned to the rubbish heap of history by the usual suspects, but who will not go gently into their dark night. From the disciples of Heidegger to a French-African satirist of international prominence (Dieudonne), Dr. Faurisson continues to electrify those who dare to question the consensus, and reject the legends to which the Establishment has conferred its supposed infallible imprimatur. 

Martin Heidegger's Black Notebooks Reignite Charges of Anti-Semitism
Philosopher Was Compromised By Involvement With Nazis

By Robert Zaretsky
The Jewish Daily Forward | February 14, 2014

On this side of the Atlantic, the imminent publication in Germany of Martin Heidegger’s “Black Notebooks” (“Schwarzen Hefte”) has caused few if any ripples. For better or worse, the philosopher who theorized about “absence from the world” has been largely absent from our world.

Yet in Europe, a surf-like pounding in newspapers and magazines has accompanied the debate over the book’s significance. Several phrases leaked from the book have reintroduced some of the great questions about Heidegger: Namely, was he anti-Semitic and, if so, was his existential philosophy fatally compromised?

Oddly, the waves of controversy have crashed with greater fury in France than Heidegger’s native Germany, not to mention the Anglo-American world. Of course, this in part reflects the waning, but still important role intellectuals play in French cultural and political life. This interest in turn inevitably spills into the national press, whose front pages have carried numerous interviews and columns on the controversy, leading one literary critic, Eric Aeschimann, to announce the arrival of the “new Heidegger Affair.”

As Aeschimann’s phrase implies, there have been older Heidegger affairs — in fact, there has been a series, which tend to erupt every decade or so. The first dates from the immediate postwar period when France, scarcely liberated from one German occupation, threw open its doors to a new and different occupation. This was not a military occupation but an intellectual one whose phenomenal nature, in every sense of the term, still stuns unsuspecting students of the era.

Rather than launching Stukas and Panzers, the new invasion employed the obscurely portentous language of German phenomenology to pound the French, or at least a good number of intellectuals, into submission. Of course, the strategist behind this campaign was none other than Heidegger. In 1946, a denazification committee at the University of Freiburg, reviewing Heidegger’s decision to join the Nazi Party, and his activities as the university’s rector between 1933-1934, decided to ban him from teaching. Perhaps the most damning witness was the philosopher Karl Jaspers, who had reluctantly concluded that his former friend’s manner of thinking was “unfree, dictatorial and incapable of communication.” (One wonders if, as he wrote this letter, Jaspers recalled the conversation he had with Heidegger soon after Hitler came to power. When Jaspers demanded to know how someone as “uneducated” as Hitler could rule Germany, Heidegger replied: “It’s not a question of education; just look at his marvelous hands”).

Yet, it was the hand offered by the French philosopher Jean Beaufret that pulled Heidegger from the professional exile imposed by the Freiburg committee. Shortly after Jean-Paul Sartre, whose own thought was inspired by Heidegger’s work, gave his celebrated public talk “Existentialism is a Humanism,” Beaufret contacted Heidegger for his reaction. While Heidegger replied that Sartre had completely misunderstood his writings, this was less important than the public’s misunderstanding of Beaufret’s motivations. 

As the Heidegger scholar Richard Wolin notes, Beaufret, who had fought with the Resistance, soon gravitated towards the dark planet of Holocaust denial. In a letter he wrote to the notorious negationist Robert Faurisson, Beaufret reassured him that he, like Faurisson, had “traveled the same path” and had been “considered suspect for having expressed the same doubts” about the gas chambers. In the same letter, Beaufret congratulated himself for having shared his views with Faurisson, and never committing them to paper. The same cannot be said for his work on behalf of Heidegger: Beaufret morphed into a veritable public relations firm for the Nazi thinker, serving as his privileged interlocutor and interpreter in France. 

While Sartre soon distanced himself from Heidegger’s writings, other and younger postwar intellectuals like Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault were drawn to them; they became the darling of self-described revolutionaries on the left rather than reactionaries on the right. For good reason, Heidegger chuckled that when the French talk philosophy, they think in German.

Only toward the end of the century did French intellectuals begin to grasp how odd a bedfellow Heidegger truly was. They had applauded his critique of modernity and man’s alienation from a world dominated by science and technology, but only later became appalled by his embrace of irrationality and scorn for the humanist tradition. In 1987, a former student of Heidegger’s, Victor Farias, published a book whose title — “Heidegger et le nazisme” — reflected the damning contents within. Based on thorough archival research, Farias revealed that Heidegger’s decision to join the Nazi Party was not, as his defenders claimed, opportunistic, but instead principled. 

More intriguingly, Farias claimed that Heidegger quit his position as rector at Freiburg just a year after he was named not because, as Heidegger later claimed, he was shocked to learn the true nature of the Nazi agenda. Instead, Farias argues, Heidegger stepped down when he realized that the original purity of the Nazi agenda had been diluted for political reasons.

The book sparked a firestorm in France. Francois Fédier, who had picked up the torch from the recently deceased Beaufret, flew to Heidegger’s defense, while others like Jacques Derrida flew in a different direction, conceding Heidegger’s philosophical affinities to Nazism but insisting that only those steeped in his writings can take the true measure of this thought. (Not only did this, in Derrida’s eyes, disqualify Farias, but also reviewers like me.) Yet others like André Glucksmann, while they found Farias’s analysis wanting, agreed that the value of Heidegger’s thought, and not just his politics, was deeply suspect.

The controversy, which revealed that a growing number of French philosophers were no longer thinking in German, was repeated nearly a decade later with the publication of Emmanuel Faye’s “Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy.” Faye offered a more refined and rich reading of Heidegger’s thought than did Farias, but one even more damning. He traced the connections between the völkisch themes in both Heidegger and Nazi ideology and the shared conviction that only a return to a presumably earlier and more authentic existence can save us from the spiritual wasteland wrought by modernity. 

Nothing short of a revolution, both for the individual and for society, could make an adequate clearing in the world to allow for being to, well, once again become. Heidegger, concluded Faye, understood that this revolution was garbed in the brown uniforms of Nazi Storm Troopers.

Blasted by Fédier and his followers in 2005, Faye — in a recent essay for Le Monde — reminds his readers of what Farias and other researchers long ago documented: Heidegger was anti-Semitic. In a letter to a colleague in 1935, he deplored the presence of “Jewish and half-Jewish students” in his classes, and in his seminars declared that “Semitic nomads” were impervious to the German spirit, which moreover was threatened by what he called the process of “Jewification.”

Warning that we cannot judge the “Black Notebooks” until they are published, Faye nevertheless notes that the published excerpts blacken the already dark portrait of Heidegger. In these fragments, Heidegger refers to a “world Jewry” with a “pronounced talent for calculation.” Such a people, for Heidegger, are ontologically challenged: Unlike the German nation, Jews will always be “uprooted from Being-in-the World.” In a word, the Jew is persona non grata not just in Hitler’s world, but in Heidegger’s world as well.***

“Will there be anything new in the “Black Notebooks?” scholars have been asking. While we wait to answer this question, we might also ask if there will be a truly new perspective adopted by Heidegger’s stalwart defenders in France.

Robert Zaretsky is a professor of history at The Honors College at the University of Houston and is the author of “A Life Worth Living: Albert Camus and the Quest for Meaning” (Harvard University Press).


***Prof. Zaretsky seems to forget that the Palestinian is persona non grata in the Orthodox rabbinic world. 
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4 comments:

Andrew E. Mathis said...

Mr. Hoffman, certainly you are not laboring under the assumption that Pound and de Man at least were not anti-Semites?

enranoss said...

Please read Martin Luther's own words in volume 47 of " Luther's Works"; the text "Against the Antinomians", from 1539. Luther was not an antinomian.
Neither is it a sign of authentic scholarship, coupling Luther to nsdap; rather it is going the Heschels Way.
Heidegger, as well as Hitler, denigrated the OT. As does the talmudists.
I thought that you had a another, more positiv view of Luther in accordance with true history, and in line with what he actually wrote. You disappoint me very much with these untruthful allegations.

Michael Hoffman said...

Dear Enranoss

The principle and crucial difference between Luther and the Nazis is that Luther did not engage in racial self-worship, which was so integral to NSDAP ideology. Therefore it cannot be said that the legacy of Lutheranism is Nazism.

You would need to read this writer’s “Martin Luther and Zinskauf: The German Reformation in the Context of the Struggle Over Usury,” (Revisionist History no. 65), to understand some of my views on Luther; also the audio CD introduction to my recitation of his book on Judaism.

Very briefly, Luther saw no application in Christian society for the Mosaic Law, even in its non-ceremonial aspects. When he fought usury it was on a New Testament basis, not because of Old Testament law. As a result he bequeathed to less pious Protestant Germans a sense that the Old Testament was not just antiquated, but unhelpful.

This was very different from early British and British American Protestantism that routinely cited Jubilee Law and other aspects of the Pentateuch's economic statutes and judgments, for guidance on the regulation of civil life and finance. This resulted in an independence from government authority and a suspicion toward it which the Germans, beginning in the mid-16th century, largely did not embrace.

Remember that Luther was horrified by the armed resistance of the German peasants who mistakenly assumed that Luther's theology was a license for revolution. Luther’s reaction was to preach servile subjection to the state, which created the type of “obedient German” who centuries later supported Nazism because it was synonymous with the state.

In Anglo-Saxon lands the implementation (however limited) of Old Testament law led to the view that each yeoman was sovereign, particularly in America among the Congregationalists, and in England among the non-conforming divines from the end of the 17th century onward.

Michael Hoffman
www.revisionisthistory.org

enranoss said...

Dear Mr Hoffman, my initial objection was that as to the alleged anti-nominianism of Dr Martin Luther, of which he was of no sorts, never suspending the law, as did the pharisees and kasuistic Rome.
After reading, when you pointed to usury, your treatise in letter nr 65, I'm even more convinced that Luther held a most praiseworthy position. Isn't coercion the way we bring about all those krypto-existencies. And holding the debtor accountable, doesn't that double the burden?
As for doctrine, what Luther developed was a clearer view of the gospel, obscured as it was by romanism.
There are a lot of "what if's"at the end of letter 65, and these were the ones that Luther opposed to. If they weren't brought into existence, he wouldn't have a reason for being disgrunteld, would he?
There is all the reason in the world to be aware of the the total antagonism between Hegel and Luther, the former being most fully accountable for the mentality alluded to.
With respect.